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Introduction 
Employee voice has become an issue of much focus in contemporary industrial relations, human 
resource management and organisational behaviour literatures. Much of the focus has been 
concerned with evaluating the different forms and processes of voice in terms of its alleged efficacy, 
worker representation and performance.  This chapter however will look at what may be regarded 
as the antithesis of employee voice: worker silence. As will be outlined, the literature to date has 
been dominated by scholars from organisational behaviour, and to a lesser extent labour process 
and critical management studies research. However, this chapter will show that employment 
relations scholarship can make a valuable contribution to this area by focussing on how 
management silence workers.  To do this, the chapter will review briefly the literature on worker 
silence to date and highlight some key weaknesses. It will argue how an employment relations 
perspective can be instructive about worker silence and in particular the neglected role of 
management in silencing worker voice.  After outlining the nature of our study’s focus on the 
implementation of the EU’s Information and Consultation Directive in the UK and Ireland, the data 
will show how management responded in three cases to avoid elements of the Directive to prevent 
worker voice, i.e. how management acted in silencing workers.   The chapter will close by discussing 
the implications of the analysis. 
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A Review of the Literature on silence and relationship to voice 
Worker voice is the latest term which has come into fashion to describe various types of 
management-worker interaction. While for a period, employee involvement and participation was 
used to describe worker inclusion around work tasks and the like, the term voice is perceived to be 
broader and includes direct and indirect participation including issues of representation (Wilkinson 
et al, 2014).  Research into voice has highlighted the myriad meanings associated with the term 
(Dundon et al, 2004).  Without doubt its meaning varies greatly.  For example, Morrison (2011) 
associates worker voice with being pro-social, individual and informal in nature.  As such, voice is 
understood as workers directly communicating with management with a mind to improving business 
operations.  This approach has been criticised by Barry and Wilkinson (2016) as being partial as it 
only considers voice in terms of the extent to which it aligns with what management wants and fails 
to recognise the fact that competing interests are central to the employment relationship. These 
distinctions will not be laboured in this chapter.  Rather the point is that the literature to date on 
silence has been dominated by the more organisational behaviour approach, with rather limited 
attention from those of a more pluralist and radical orientation.  However, this may be due to a 
methodological issue: how do researchers identify incidents of where workers have not been able to 
speak up about issues as to their concern? As such, the chapter will put forward the concept of 
managerial silencing as a method of understanding the voice-silence dynamics of the employment 
relationship.   
 
Organisational Behaviour: The emergence of worker silence 
Research into employee silence first emerged from scholars in the area of organisational behaviour 
where silence has been generally conceptualised as the conscious withholding of information by 
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workers, with an in-built assumption that voicing concerns is an alternative choice. It is therefore a 
communicative choice which employees may decide to adopt. Morrison and Miliken (2000) 
introduced the concept and highlighted silence as a situation of when workers consciously decide to 
withhold information from managers which could be of benefit to the organisation.  Two key 
features are important to highlight from their approach.  The first of these is that the information 
withheld is information which otherwise would be useful to management in pursuit of the interests 
of management.  Secondly, the information is intentionally withheld by workers which carries with it 
an assumption that there is an avenue through which workers could pursue their voice were it not 
for their choice to withhold. They particularly focussed on developing an argument that 
organisations developed ‘systematic cultures’ of silence where employees do not express their ideas 
and do not speak the truth due to a fear of negative repercussions and/or to beliefs that their 
opinions are not valued (see also Pinder and Harlos, 2001). A particular issue highlighted was 
employees were very focused on what they saw as the potential negative outcomes, or risks, of 
speaking up (Miliken et al, 2003): The desire to avoid negative outcomes influenced significantly 
their decisions to remain silent. Furthermore, employee silence was seen to stem from a reluctance 
to convey negative information because of the discomfort associated with being the conveyer of bad 
news and the effect this may have on a worker’s image to management and their peers at work (cf. 
Morrison and Rothman, 2009). There are seen to be powerful norms within the workplace that often 
prevent employees from saying what they know. In this research, many respondents expressed 
concerns about damaging relationships or fear of retaliation and punishment, such as losing their job 
or not getting a promotion (c.f. Miliken et al. 2003: 1462). 
 
While this approach has been criticised for its overly managerialist approach, it certainly brings 
attention onto the issue of workers maintaining silence and some sources of such silence.  However, 
the biggest weakness of this approach is that, with the exception of inappropriate actions by 
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individual managers, it fails to examine the role which managers may play in creating silence.  In fact, 
Pinder and Harlos (2001) defined employee silence as withholding genuine expressions about 
behavioural, cognitive, and/or affective evaluations of organisational circumstances to people who 
seem capable of changing the situation, i.e. there is an assumption that managerial interests and 
workers interests align in such situations. Indeed silence tends to be conceptualised in a fashion of 
withholding ideas, information and opinions with relevance to improvements in work and work 
organisation (Van Dyne et al. 2003) and where “new ideas facilitate continuous improvement” (Van 
Dyne and Lepine, 1998).  The position presented in this chapter is based upon an assumption that 
there will be circumstances in which management wish for employees to be silent.  As such, the 
mechanisms through which voice is channelled are not neutral: they have highly political 
consequences.  Thus, the design of employee voice systems, who represents and does not represent 
employees and the responses to such representation is a central issue in silence.   
 
Critical Management/Organisational Studies: the silent worker effort 
A second approach to silence is one of workers who silence themselves based on what are perceived 
to be the professional and ideological demands of their profession, emerging from the area of 
critical management studies/organisation studies.  Brown and Coupland (2005) highlight how the 
training of accountants places a constraint on their speaking out about issues of concern. In contrast 
to the organisational behaviour approach, this approach recognises that management may actively 
discourage employee voice and thereby produce silence. This might be achieved through “normal 
pressures, ideal-types of worker and accounts of overt attempts to quieten them through notional 
rules and embarrassment” (Brown and Coupland, 2005: 1062). Unlike the literature reviewed in the 
organisational behaviour tradition, silence is seen as dialectically empowering for workers too: in 
this case of graduate trainees, silence functioned as a resource whereby organisational cultures - 
discouraging of new ideas for junior personnel - effectively relieving this group from the 
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responsibility to act. That silence might also be a form of power, rather than powerlessness, is 
evident in Fletcher and Watson (2007) who highlight that silence can actually be an important tool 
for workers when exercising power as per Lukes’ second and third dimensions of power. In a similar 
vein, Dean and Greene (2017) highlight how workers in professions where there is a particular 
ideological vocation associated with the role, such as clergy and actors in their examples,  may 
refrain from speaking out and view their dissatisfaction as part of the sacrifice that is paid as price 
for their affective commitment to that occupation.  Within both these papers, the role of ideological 
constraints whether through managerial type or inter-worker discursive practices are highlighted.  
While recognising that such ideological tools may be an important part of the armoury of 
management in issues around the silencing of individual workers, the focus of this chapter is on how 
management may shape, create, and destroy structures through which types and forms of voice may 
be expressed.  
The critical management studies (CMS) based approach to understanding worker silence addresses 
some of the pitfalls of the micro-dominated OB approach. However, much of the post-modernist 
strain of CMS argues workers become ‘self-disciplined/consenting’ subjects who willingly buy-in to 
improving customer service and quality (Ashcraft, 2005:69-83). It is then argued that acts such as 
silence, voice or even resistance function as an ‘escape’ into work effort (Knights et al., 1999:19-20). 
A problem with these interpretations is employee (and union) responses are portrayed as somewhat 
futile. We argue, in contrast, there are counter debates which question the extent to which voice is 
‘allowed’ by management, and the factors at play which regulate the positions of power and 
authority over how much voice (and silence) management either support or withhold (e.g. Ramsey, 
1977; Marchington et al., 1992). We extend employment relations analysis and labour process 
theory that voice and silence can be examined through the prism of the “frontier of control” 
(Goodrich, 1920) in that voice like other areas of the employment relationship plays a key role in 
terms of workplace struggles (Donaghey et al, 2011; Cullinane and Donaghey, 2014). As such, the 
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issue of the extent to which workers and management contest the shape and form of issues over 
which there is voice or silence is a key issue in the sociology of organisations.   
 
Employment Relations and Labour Process Theory: Identifying and silencing workers 
As indicated, one of the key issues for employment relations and sociological approaches concerning 
labour process debates is how to evaluate something which is not readily identifiable (silence). This  
approach to voice has generally focussed on the identification of mechanisms, processes and 
institutions of worker voice and evaluating the extent to which these provide for meaningful voice or 
not (Dundon et al, 2004; Wilkinson et al, 2014). Methodologically, the organisational behaviour 
approach has generally focussed on employee surveys and asked workers to identify reasons for not 
speaking out on various issues.  The CMS approach has generally again focussed on individual level 
analysis, but uses a qualitative approach to linguistic analysis and the re-interpretation of knowledge 
to evaluate how these organisational dynamics involve workers accepting hegemonic pressures not 
to speak out and even willingly embrace negative situations.  In contrast, there has been some 
research addressing worker silence from an employment relations and labour process perspective. 
Wilman, Bryson and Gomez (2006) in their “Sounds of Silence” paper, using quantitative data from 
the UK’s Workplace Employment Relations Survey test for the presence or absence of particular 
voice mechanisms, with the absence being used to extrapolate the presence of worker silence. Using 
a qualitative case study method, Graham (1993) shows how workers in a car manufacturing plant 
collectively mobilised against management by refusing to share information about quality and 
production tasks. In other words, by actively remaining silent worker effectively challenged 
managements’ authority to intensify work effort.  
However, these are not entirely satisfactory.  While the presence or absence of various features may 
be a proxy for silence, this chapter will argue that from an employment relations perspective, an 
alternative approach may be insightful.  This approach is one of examining where ‘management 
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engages in acts of silencing workers’. This differs from extrapolating the presence or absence of 
policies and practice, and it differs from workers either actively or unconsciously remaining silent in 
response to management. As Kaufman (2014:19) has suggested that while ‘employees deliberately 
withdraw their effort or use voice in order to advance their economic position, employers actively 
discourage voice due to their perception that it is undesirable’. To demonstrate our approach we 
look at an example of where management were under a legal duty to respond to employee requests 
for voice and the ways in which they responded to such requests. As will be outlined, even though 
there was a duty enshrined in law, management actions were such as to in effect seek to 
circumscribe the extent to which worker voice was enacted. In particular, we highlight the role of 
management ‘counter-mobilisation’ (Kelly, 1998) in silencing workers. Kelly (1998) argues for the use 
of mobilisation theory as a lens to understand worker collective action: workers have divergent 
interests from employers, they mobilise around a collectively held grievance attributed to the action 
of the employer through collective organisation.  This mobilisation forms around a particular 
opportunity to express the grievances with collective action.   Kelly highlights that employers will 
counter-mobilise through ameliorating the source of the grievance or through more punitive tactics.  
This chapter argues that the mobilisation of workers led to employer responses which carried with it 
shared features: on the one hand, the employers made some concessions around the substantive 
issues which drove the grievances about voice; secondly, employer-driven voice mechanisms were 
established which fell short of what workers sought but were presented as being a substitute for the 
form which the workers sought; thirdly, after the initial pressure dissipated, these voice mechanisms 
were allowed to atrophy.  Thus, through a counter-mobilising strategy, management were able to 
exercise silencing of workers.    
 
Employers Counter-Mobilisation Strategy - The research 
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The research upon which this chapter looks at the implementation of the EU’s Information and 
Consultation Directive (2002/14/EC) in the UK and Republic of Ireland.  While the project did not 
specifically focus on silence per se but on the extent to which the Directive introduced worker voice, 
evidence is presented from three cases where management explicitly had to respond to requests or 
pressure from workers to establish more robust forms of employee representation and how 
management responded to such requests. In recent years, the European Commission has been 
prominent in advancing an indirect, collectivist route to employee voice with legislation covering 
works council’s in multinationals, collective redundancies and a general right to information and 
consultation. The latter was dealt with through European Directive (2002/14/EC) on Employee 
Information and Consultation which emerged from the shock announcement of 3000 redundancies 
at the Renault Plant in Vilvoorde, Belgium, in 1997. Summarised simply, the Directive sets out the 
requirements for a permanent and statutory framework for employee information and consultation. 
Directive 2002/14/EC (European Commission, 2002) marked the introduction of workers’ general 
right to information and consultation for the first time through standing structures across the 
European Union.  While the situation occurred in Belgium, it was always felt that the legislation 
would particularly affect the voluntarist economies of the Republic of Ireland and the UK (Gollan and 
Wilkinson, 2007; Hall, 2005). This was because most other EU member states at the time, had 
mandatory works councils or similar arrangements for representative and collective voice.   While 
the initial draft of the legislation proposed measures including the right for managerial decisions to 
be overturned where the levels of information and consultation were insufficient, the Directive 
when finally passed the EU’s legislative process was much weaker in nature.  In addition, the nature 
of EU Directives is such that a large degree of discretion is afforded to member states in terms of the 
ways in which they choose to implement the Directive.  
Due to pre-existing legislation in most EU member states, many countries had to make little to no 
changes with the UK and Ireland standing out as the exceptions (Donaghey et al, 2013). While there 
were differences in the detail, the UK and Ireland implemented the directive in broadly similar ways.   
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First, in neither state was a positive obligation placed on business to establish employee 
representative bodies.  Rather, in both states, employers had to respond and establish a body when 
approximately 10% of workers signed a request for such a body. Secondly, as such, it was an 
example of what has been labelled as EU reflexive law where rights are to be triggered by individuals 
rather than positive rights per se.  Thirdly, within both countries there is no significant privilege in 
terms of trade unions as worker representatives. Fourthly, in both countries provisions were 
established where “pre-existing arrangements” were to be given priority over a default model.  
Under this provision, companies which had for example recognised trade unions or a pre-existing 
Non-Union Employee Representation Scheme could claim that this should be the mechanism for 
fulfilling the requirements of the Directive.   
 
The directive states that organisations will have to inform and consult with employee 
representatives (whether union and/or non-union) on three general areas: the economic situation of 
the organisation; the structure and probable development of employment (including any threats to 
employment); and to inform and consult on decisions likely to lead to change in work organisations 
or contractual relations (Hall et al. 2013). Whilst the transposition of the directive was relatively 
unproblematic in most EU member states, where mandatory and more taxing national works 
council’s legislation existed, it proved more controversial in the Anglophone economies of the UK 
and Ireland, given the absence of a statutory system for involvement and participation and the 
historical dominance of voluntarist systems of employment relations (Sisson, 2002). Potentially, the 
net effect of the directive was, for the first time, to allow British and Irish workers a legal right to be 
informed and consulted on a range of business and employment issues.  
On a number of levels the implementation, or non-implementation, of the Directive in the UK and 
Ireland is of conceptual relevance to an illumination of our arguments on the role of management in 
engineering spheres of employee silence. As has been established, the final transposition of the 
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directive into both the UK and Irish contexts was minimalist (Hall, 2005; Dundon et al, 2006; Dundon 
et al, 2014). In both jurisdictions, the nature of the transposed legislation offered a substantial 
degree of flexibility conducive to management, which could check or minimise the emergence of 
potentially robust voice regimes. This derived from a mixture of government reticence and employer 
obstinacy which saw the directive significant diluted in transposition (Dundon et al, 2014); from one 
offering an absolute right to information and consultation to a right which is now only conferred 
when a group of workers elect to claim the right. Other noticeable areas in which the full force of the 
directive was restricted was the flexibility provided to employers surrounding pre-existing 
agreements and a recognition that direct involvement schemes would not be compromised by 
directive. 
 
Whilst an initial requirement in the draft directive for enterprises to report on the ‘probable 
economic and financial situation’ of enterprises was replaced by ‘probable economic situation’ 
reducing the level of financial reporting obligations. Whilst these efforts to reduce employee voice 
from the remit of strategic management decision-making were largely a product of manoeuvrings at 
the national-level, the substance of such activities provided the template to replicate this at 
workplace level also. Employers have considerable flexibility of response, including relying on 
employee ignorance and thereby giving free scope to do nothing. Employees face difficulties when 
attempting to trigger the procedures and may have to fight to secure information and consultation 
rights (Cullinane et al, 2015; Roche and Geary, 2005). In the main, employers are unlikely to 
volunteer to introduce such arrangements, unless they can perceive a competitive advantage in so 
doing, and, outside of union strongholds, non-unionised employees may be largely unaware of these 
new rights. Indeed, given the manner of transposition, employers may simply be able to adopt of a 
policy of maintaining their existing arrangements where they consider current information and 
consultation machinery safe from employee challenges to set in motion the legislative process. 
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Management can potentially use the formal protection provided in the regulations by having pre-
existing agreements in place which comply with the necessary criteria. These pre-existing 
agreements could be used as a vehicle to circumvent the likelihood of a potentially more robust 
statutory model being imposed later on. How management are responding to this legislation then 
remains a pertinent one and provides a highly contemporaneous avenue upon which to explore the 
conceptual themes around managerial silencing discussed above.  The following section draws on 
three illustrative cases to explore these relationship. 
 
Research Case Studies 
The cases outlined in this Chapter all involved companies who explicitly addressed issues involving 
the implementation of the Information and Consultation Directive. In the first two, one from the UK 
and one from the Republic of Ireland, management used the provisions of the directive to establish a 
voice mechanism instead of recognising a trade union.  In the third, an organisation form the 
Republic of Ireland, management were highly resistant to the establishment of the default provision 
arising from the implementing legislation in the Republic of Ireland. Thus, the legislated mechanism 
of voice in all three became a significant contested terrain between management-worker.   What 
unifies all three cases is that within the establishment, workers were seeking the establishment of a 
more robust form of worker representation than which management were willing to cede.  
 
Case Study One - Manufacture Co 
Background 
Manufacture Co is a family owned company operating in Belfast, Northern Ireland.  At the time of 
the research, 300 people were employed in its single site with the main concentration being 
involved in manufacture and assembly of products.  The company had expanded rapidly in the 
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decade after the turn of the millennium, going from a small enterprise to being a mid-sized 
manufacturer. Unusually for a medium sized family owned firm in manufacturing it had a well-
developed and well-resourced HR function. The company prided itself on the quality of its people 
management and high commitment human resource climate. There was extensive communication 
using a variety of media with shop floor employees.  As the company expanded in size and in order 
to fulfil the requirements of the Investors in People human resources standard, the company 
established a non-union employee representation forum.  The company specifically used the default 
in the Information and Consultation of Employees regulations as its template.  Within a year, the 
forum had atrophied with neither management nor workers showing much interest: with its nature 
as a family firm, many of the workers instead opted to go straight to the owner family.  
 
Contesting the Terrain 
Disquiet emerged in the firm associated with a new productivity pay system and the 
suspension of the bonus mechanism. This saw the emergence of what was viewed by management 
as an aggressive union recognition campaign though estimates put trade union membership never 
getting much above 10% of the workforce.  At this point, management re-initiated the employee 
forum as a mechanism to discuss issues of employee concern.   
The company was non-union despite recruitment efforts in the mid-2000s by one union. 
Information and consultation arrangements focussed on an employee forum established under the 
regulations as a pre-existing agreement (PEA). It had seven employee representatives and five 
members of management. Notionally it met each quarter but more frequent meetings were 
sometimes held. A number of stimuli seemed to be associated with the founding of the forum in 
2005. An accreditation body had suggested it to improve communications; some workers 
interviewed suggested it was an alternative to the union designed to pre-empt the regulations as a 
Pre-Existing Arrangement; the growth of the company required more formal communication 
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methods and, most obviously, it was seen as best practice. The forum covered a wide range of topics 
for information and consultation including probable decisions which will have a substantial impact 
on aspects of employment and work organisation. Normally information papers were given to 
employee representatives three weeks prior to the forum meeting to allow for representatives to 
consult with employees, formulate their opinions and gain a response. A pre-meeting was held to 
aide this process. Representatives were allocated time before and after meetings to talk with their 
constituents. Some used time at the end of the supervisors’ team briefing to report on forum 
matters but others do not give this part of their role much priority.  
Views on the success of the Forum vary. It was highly regarded by management who valued 
the opportunity it gave them to explain the basis of decisions and dispel rumours. However, 
employees were more sceptical suggesting it was used to legitimise management behaviour. They 
also highlighted it could get bogged down with house-keeping matters raised by employee 
representatives. It also proved hard to get employees to stand as representatives and it was rare for 
an election to be required. On the other hand the Forum was used by employees to debate big 
issues such as the productivity bonus which did lead to changes in bonus design before it was frozen 
in economic crisis. However, this was some years ago and some representatives believe the Forum 
now has no influence over management and is thus seen as an irrelevance. One difficulty for 
representatives was how to find a distinctive role. Some believed that rather than employees raising 
matters directly with their supervisor they should ask the representative to deal with it. The 
reluctance to do this restricted their role and wider influence. This was because, it was not clear 
whether individual issues are appropriate topics for collective consultation. These ambiguities may 
reflect lack of training given to representatives. Management initiated the process with the goal of 
reaching active consultation.  However, when faced with organisational difficulties there was a 
reversion to information /organisational communicator indicating that consultation only developed 
at a superficial level.  As such the process effectively atrophied due to the lack of substantial matters 
it deals with and through the way management has developed and managed the relationship. 
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Case Study Two – BritCo 
Background 
BritCo is a former state owned enterprise from the UK which was privatised by the Thatcher 
government in the 1980s.  Following privatisation, it expanded internationally and began operating 
in over 80 countries across the world and began operations in Ireland in about 2000.  In 2005, the 
company reorganised and merged its operations in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland into 
one unit “BritCo Ireland”.  The company has high levels of unionisation within its UK operations, 
including Northern Ireland.  However, for its non-UK operations, it pursues a policy of avoiding and 
not recognising trade unions including in the Republic of Ireland.  What was notable about this 
arrangement was that while the company was operating in business terms as “BritCo Ireland”, 
workers in the Northern Irish section were covered by agreement bargained collectively in the UK 
with the firm operating a “double-breasting” regime (Cullinane et al, 2011; Dundon et al, 2014).  
Contesting the Terrain 
A divergence occurred in terms and conditions of employment within the same business unit. This 
divergence was magnified around two issues: redundancies and pay scales.  In Northern Ireland, 
workers were covered by a no compulsory redundancy agreement while there was no such cover for 
workers in the Republic of Ireland.  Secondly, workers in Northern Ireland were paid according to 
collectively agreed pay scales whereas in the Republic of Ireland, staff were effectively on individual 
salaries with no pay scales, role profiles or other objective rationale to justify salary points. This led 
to a feeling of resentment amongst some workers in the Republic of Ireland as the more favourable 
terms in the North were associated with the unionised set up.  
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In response to this a union organising campaign was initiated by a specific group of workers in the 
company.  The message of the campaign was built around the unequal treatment of workers in the 
Republic of Ireland, compared to Northern Ireland.  Within the Republic of Ireland, a non-Union 
Employee Representation Scheme had been established under the auspices of fulfilling the 
requirements of the Provision of Employee (Information and Consultation) Act 2006.  However, it 
was viewed as being very weak and generally ineffective and had become defunct by early 2007. 
With the commencement of the union recognition campaign, management decided to revamp this 
forum.  In particular, significant effort was put into establishing electoral constituencies with 
approximately one representative per hundred workers. In addition, while previously the forum had 
become a forum for management to present information to worker representatives, workers now 
were given the opportunity to raise issues for inclusion on the agenda.      
Two particular issues arose, the redundancy policy and issues around pay transparency. For both 
issues, management was insistent that the forums were clearly there for information and 
consultation, not negotiation.  On the issue of redundancy, the forum saw a redrafting of the 
redundancy policy, with a significant increase in redundancy payments.  However, the company 
insisted on having the ability to pursue compulsory redundancies in the Republic of Ireland, in 
contrast to Northern Ireland.  With regard to pay transparency, there was little movement on the 
issue of pay scales.  The company did introduce a new system where workers were to be told some 
details of pay determination but the scales remained invisible to workers with no clear criteria as to 
pay levels. In the short-term, the establishment of the forum and the partial addressing of the 
grievances at the forefront of the union organising campaign were viewed to have settled much of 
the disquiet.  However, following this, employee representatives noted that the utility of the forum 
diminished and had become reduced to discussing rather mundane issues.  
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Case Study Three  - High-TechCo1 
High-TechCo is a high end US-owned manufacturing company based in the Republic of Ireland. A 
profitable company, at time of the research, it had over 70 sites across five continents, employing 
25,000 people. The company had three sites in Ireland employing over 4000. The focus of the study 
is its largest plant facility employing close to 3000 mainly in assembly line work, which is also its 
largest manufacturing site in its global plant network. It has a large, well-resourced personnel 
department, which has received awards from professional accreditors for its people-management 
practices. The Company had no representative voice mechanisms in existence and there were a 
number of disgruntled staff who were frustrated at the way in which they perceived the company to 
operate in terms of communicating with staff.  This small group of worker activists decided to trigger 
an employee request for the establishment of an Information and Consultation Forum under the 
Irish implementing legislation.  What is notable is that this group of workers very consciously did not 
wish to see this as a union organising campaign and did not want to see union involvement in the 
campaign.   
Contesting the Terrain 
The workers submitted what they believed to be the required number of signatures to the Labour 
Relations Commission (LRC), the statutory body charged with implementing the legislation in the 
Republic of Ireland.  In response to this, High-TechCo claimed that they had a functioning forum 
under the legislation for the previous four years which they claimed should be treated as a “Pre-
Existing Arrangement” which under Irish law takes precedence over the legislation. Despite this 
claim from the company, there was no substantial evidence produced to verify the claims that the 
forum had been in existence for any substantial period. High-TechCo then circulated a request for 
new members to this forum with management selecting from the volunteers the workers who would 
                                                            
1 This is a summary of the full case as presented in Cullinane et al (2015).  Note that the pseudonym has been 
changed to maintain consistency with the other two cases presented.  
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sit on the forum, rather than carrying out democratic elections of representatives.  All those selected 
were of supervisory grade in the company.       
The worker activists persisted in trying to establish a forum under the legislation and a series of 
exchanges occurred between the workers, the company and the LRC.  Eventually, the company 
decided to hold a worker referendum to allow workers to decide which forum they wished to 
support.  The company also decided to run representative elections which ran concurrently with the 
referendum.  Management encouraged workers to support their preferred option and placed 
logistical limitations, such as preventing the activists from promoting the alternative in areas other 
than their own work unit and only circulating material produced by management, that prevented 
the activists from engaging in meaningful canvassing across the company.  In addition, High-TechCo 
provided a FAQ sheet with the referendum that minimised differences in the two alternatives.  The 
company refused to publicise the results of the referendum, except to say that their preferred 
option had secured a majority.  However, two of the activists who had been organising the campaign 
for the alternative forum were elected as worker representatives. Shortly afterwards, both of these 
workers were dismissed from the Company for undocumented sick leave.  Both took cases to 
employment tribunals for unfair dismissal with the cases settled outside the tribunal.   Significantly, 
after the referendum result and the exit of the two worker activists, the company’s attention to 
maintaining the forum shifted and the initiative has rather unsurprisingly withered.  
 
Discussion and conclusion 
Two key issues arise in this chapter.  The first is that worker silence must be viewed over time and 
space and in variable macro contexts of broader understandings of the employment relationship.  To 
view silence in terms as outlined in the prevalent organisational behaviour approach misses out on 
both the nuances of organisational and wider societal level dynamics where silencing essentially 
emerges as a managerial tactic to side-line controversial issues within the specific context of the 
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employment relationship. Similarly, the CMS and organisational studies approach to worker silence 
risks viewing employee activities and employment structures that shape divergent interests as 
marginal, or worse still as futile.  Within the three cases discussed, a common thread was that the 
response of management was that any commitment to developing representative voice was done so 
in a minimalist way and in response to specific pressures in the workplace: once these issues 
subsided, there was noticeable reduction in the commitment of management to the voice forums.  
In terms of responding to employee pushes for greater and more meaningful voice, organisational 
management adopted multiple and at times uneven approaches.  On the one hand, actions over 
substantive issues were reinvigorated in the short term to deal with worker demands for better 
quality voice, including in two of the three cases reconstituted non-union employee representation 
forums. On the other hand, by maintaining in the medium to long term an approach which strictly 
limited the forums once initial grievances dissipated, the structures atrophied.  As such, worker 
silence is more than simply workers exercising a choice over whether or not to speak out: silence is 
an organisational phenomenon which can be seen, in part at least, to be socially engineered to 
reinforce the power of employer actors.  As such, the recognition that organisations are made up of 
a plurality of competing interests and that voice is central to the struggle and contested terrain 
between these voices, encourages the importance of identifying how one party can silence another 
party.  
Secondly, empirically identifying silence can be a difficult task when silence is seen as the 
lack of opportunity for workers to voice their concerns. For example, can it be said just because 
workers don’t voice their opinions or have structures through which to voice their opinions that they 
are silent? That said, this chapter presents an approach which highlights that silence is an issue of 
importance for scholars of employment relations and that focussing on cases of when and how 
management respond to calls for improved worker voice can be instructive in understanding how 
management silence workers.  What makes the contribution of employment relations and wider 
labour process synthesis important in this area is a deeper understanding of the dynamics and 
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complexities of how interests play a role in shaping mobilisation and counter-mobilisation in terms 
of voice mechanisms.  Worker voice is a key area of employment relations research and by 
examining the dynamics of the voice and silence extends analysis beyond a narrow dyadic to bring 
broader valuable light onto the entire area of research into worker voice.      
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